It is thus logical that the issue of boundaries appears in its two distinct acceptations in the opening and the closing chapters: the first chapter looks at how Aristotle delimits the method of natural science; the last one revisits the borderline between the physical and the metaphysical. James G.
Other inquiries into natural bodies deploy their own methodological norms, but they cannot avoid using concepts discussed most thoroughly in the Physics.
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- On Aristotle Physics 2 by John Philoponus and a r Lacey.
As Lennox reminds us, that there is change, and thus that nature is its principle is, for Aristotle, plainly obvious. But what change and thus nature is, remains to be determined.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 2
Kelsey brings together two strains of this book: the definition of nature as a principle of motion and rest, and the view that nature is form rather than anything else. Hence the conclusion, only implicit in Aristotle, is that form is the principle of motion. This break with both the Presocratic and the Platonic views of how motion can be initiated necessitates a new explanation of how form can move things. This is how the form, by being an end, conditions natural beings to precisely that activity that enables the form to be perpetuated in its enmattered state. By the same token, the charge of Platonism is preempted.
Another discussion of nature as the principle of change comes from Stasinos Stavrianeas whose focus is on the definition of nature.
On his reading, this amply conceived rather than scientifically exact definition enables the inquiry into nature to accommodate phenomena as different as the motion of the inanimate elements and the generative motions of animate bodies. Implying the inherence of nature as principle of motion including generation in the moving thing, this definition is also helpful in distinguishing between natural bodies and artifacts, including the seemingly miraculous automata.
This inherence is then what opposes nature as cause to accidental cause whose character is discussed by James Allen.
On a closer look, such an opposition dissolves and we can understand various chance events as additional outcomes of generally successful teleological processes. Bluntly put, chance has thus no chance to rule the natural world. Scharle reads the passage in question in the light of other texts including Metaphysics XII 10, and concludes that the example of winter rain points to a regularity which cannot be brought forth by art.
Rosen concludes that Books V-VI do indeed preempt the later negative arguments against the possibility of eternal rectilinear motion, but Aristotle can still secure the priority of circular over rectilinear motion by other arguments available in the corpus.
What this means is that character virtue does not itself follow from a generation or an alteration but, being relational, it is conditioned by a fine physiological tuning of our perceptive soul. Andrea Falcone submits that Physics VIII treats the first unmoved mover within the boundaries of natural science, where Aristotle first demonstrates that there is eternal continuous motion, and then asks what exactly such motion is.
In sum, we discovered more about middle terms which simply describe a dependence that an effect or being has for existing. The formal and final cause are intrinsic principles because the effect depends on them, while the agent and final are extrinsic because in order to bring about eh emergence from within matter, an agent is needed and an agent needs to have an end will be covered in more depth why in Chs.
Chance is occasionally posited as a fifth cause, but how, the opinions vary between determinists, and indeterminists who think that everything is the result of chance.
On Aristotle Physics 2 in SearchWorks catalog
In sum, chance is not so much a cause as a plurality of causes that end with no per se line relative to another line. Statistics is evidence of order rather than chance. Something which is always there as more primary against indeterminism there is a real difference between essential and accidental.